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Teaching Them to Think
By F. W. Thornton
Of late, colleges have emphasized a claim that they teach
students to think. Sixty years ago my father taught me to swim.
The procedure was to put me in the water, support me beneath,
and cry “Swim, swim, swim.” He kept time to the cries with
spanks on the wet skin. I know that the spanks eventually
ceased and that in a feeble sort of way I can swim, from which it
may be deduced that the desire to swim, together with the urge to
escape the spanks did drive me to keep up somehow. Swimming
is not taught in that manner now; one is taught not alone the
Why, but the How.
Similarly our teachers give problems, often well selected, and
say in effect, “Think, think, think”; as though thinking were a
natural attribute needing no instruction, like breathing or the
beating of the heart. Indeed, there are not lacking those who
would teach us to breathe—does not the radio gentleman tell us to
snort breathing exercises while he counts numbers? Our pro
fessors do not even spank their budding thinkers.
About the year 1878 there appeared in Great Britain a person
calling himself Professor Charles Frusher Howard, the California
Lightning Calculator. His celerity in solving problems of straight
mathematics was, to my young mind, miraculous. He was good
enough to tell me his secret. His father, too, had been a rapid
calculator and had trained Charles to work his problems without
the use, even mentally, of words. He pointed out that in any
mathematical computation, as ordinarily conducted, almost the
entire time is taken up, not in the actual calculation, but in the
operation of clothing the result with words. Thus, he put down
a figure, say 9, and below it another, say 7, then drew a line below
them and told me to add them. The time occupied in realizing
that the total was 16 was infinitely small; one could not write the
answer quickly enough. Then another figure was placed below
the 16, to be added; again the mental operation was of unmeasur
ably short duration. This was continued until some six or eight
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figures had been added. Then these figures were placed one
below another to be added in a single operation; now the time con
sumed was quite measurably large, probably many thousand
times longer than the sum of the periods that had been needed by
the mind actually to add the figures. This difference in time was
due to the fancied need to realize to one’s self the words represent
ing the partial totals as the footing proceeded.
Another proof of the drag on the mind entailed by our custom
ary way of thinking in words was suggested by Howard. Those
who spoke more than one language were requested to perform
similar computations in two languages. Test after test showed
wide variation in time, computation in the language less readily
spoken taking the greater time.
Many years later a strange confirmation was obtained. The
Japanese are in the habit of making their smallest computations
with the soroban, the Japanese abacus. With this instrument the
unit computation is mental, and is registered not in words, but
with a flip of the fingers on the abacus. An expert operator, dis
cussing its speed, offered to compete with me in making a long
footing—six columns, 42 items to the column, items averaging
eight figures. With the help of Mr. Howard’s advice I had
gained a partial freedom from the incubus of words in footing,
and managed, by the hardest work, to win by a little. Then we
took each a large multiplication. I was not now nearly so well
able to discard words, and the soroban man left me disgracefully
behind.
The soroban expert said that the limit to the speed to be
obtained was defined by the speed with which the fingers could
move the beads, just as an expert musician’s speed on the piano is
limited by physical, not mental, agility.
Further discussion with this Japanese expert brought forth the
fact that he had been educated at Harvard, and that for a time
he was a distinguished student in mental computation. When the
teachers found that he had a little soroban in his hands and con
fiscated it, he fell to the bottom and stayed there.
This is not altogether surprising when it is considered that
without the soroban his only refuges were the English language,
which was foreign to him, and his own language that has longer
and more awkward names for the figures. Only one of our
integers—seven—has a name of two syllables, and these are
compact and pronounced almost as one. Compare this with four
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integers in Japanese—ichi, roku, shichi, hachi—all of two sylla
bles, three of them with syllables that must be pronounced
separately. I say, pronounced; not that they are spoken aloud,
but the mind, operating as it does with most of us, first makes the
computation, then repeats to itself the words representing the
result. Every one knows that if in footing a single column of
figures a large total has accumulated, the column being very long,
speed is cut down; it is so because of the habit of pronouncing
mentally such a mouthful as “seven hundred and twenty seven”
as each additional figure is added. I am of the opinion that the
highest speed at which the mind will permit these imagined words
to pass is limited to the highest speed at which the spoken word
could be understood; the mind is naturally honest and does not
easily shirk what seems to be its duty. As we have trained it it
goes through the motions of expressing itself in words that could
be understood by another. How speed in footing is gained by
adding two or three figures at once! The mental work of compu
tation is not decreased but the partial totals to be mentally
pronounced are fewer.
The bad effect of this habit of thinking in words is not by any
means limited to problems in figures. Professor Howard be
wailed the fact that only in figure computations had he learned to
omit words. Is there any doubt that the effective thinking of
those who have a copious and ready vocabulary is clearer and
more rapid than that of others more limited in their vocabulary
or less practised in its use, although, I believe, slower and less
clear than that of one who could omit words? Have we not all
met men whose thoughts are expressed in a few ready-made
phrases, that fit the thoughts like a ready-made suit of clothes?
Do not their effective thoughts bear the stamp of inferior
ity? By “effective thought” I mean the thought as it finally
emerges, clothed with words. Perhaps the original thought was
superior.
Another evil enters here: we mistake the words for the thought;
bend the thought to fit the best words that come to our minds;
credit ourselves with a brilliant thought when we really have
clothed some kind of a thought with what we consider an admi
rable form of words. Then we take the ill fitting form of words as
a basis for further thought.
Some of our teachers have so far fallen into this pit that they
have made a fetish of phrases—one says we accountants are all
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wrong because we should call reserves by another name; another
has a new name (which no man knoweth save he that inventeth it)
for invested capital. How shall these teachers teach students to
think? They berate us even when they agree with our thoughts
because we do not use their formulae; they think that they think,
whereas they have become ready-made word tailors using handme-down phrases which they substitute for thoughts.
Another of our teachers volunteers a definition of “income.”
We had this word before he was born and knew what we meant by
it. We also knew the thing that he calls “income,” and had
another name for it; we called it “outgo.” This gentleman had
not a new thought, nor has he discovered a new idea, but mistak
ing words for thoughts has misapplied a word to an idea to which
it does not refer except in his mind.
If we must use words for communicating ideas, not new and
strange but accepted meanings are needed. There can be no
“correct” meaning of any word other than the meaning it con
veys to another; that is its entire reason for existence.
There is more argument among accountants over forms of
expression than over all real differences of opinion. All of us hold
that plain honesty is the only test of accounting theory but we use
varying words to express the same meaning.
The relative celerity of thought as it is or is not reduced to
words is well enough recognized, but only indirectly. We speak
of the operation of the subconscious mind, of intuition—are these
more than thought without words? Our ordinary practice might
well be described as the operation of the self-conscious mind.
Can we not train ourselves to make use of the so-called subcon
scious mind? I think so; indeed I have attributed whatever
clarity or speed of thought I have ever attained to an attempt to
use the subconscious mind. This, perhaps, is not an argument
in its favor, but I assure you that but for this attempt my mind
would have operated even less clearly and quickly.
Dangers attend the person who can control his subconscious
mind. In discussions of involved matters for instance, the mind
may detect a fallacy instantly: if it be declared before the thinker
has clothed it with words, he risks the charge that he is guessing
or at least judging upon insufficient premises. We should not
need words to think for ourselves: we must have them to impart
our thoughts to others. The contempt with which the more ig
norant look upon an opinion not immediately supported by a
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demonstration in words tends to make the thinker doubtful of his
own mind and ready to fall into the slough of words in which
others struggle.
Here are, then, two lines of development that might be culti
vated : wordless thought for one’s own benefit and the ability to
put that thought into the most nearly suitable words for the
benefit of others. Probably no words ever expressed any thought
more than approximately. Try to express the same thought in
several languages; you may then find how inexactly words express
our ideas.
No words halt the mental operations of the chess expert who
plays many simultaneous games, blindfolded; his work stands out
from the mass of mental exercise as a singular feat of the mind.
It is no more, I verily believe, than could be done in other fields
of thought were we but rid of this clogging, hampering habit
of putting every thought into words. The expert has a mental
wordless picture of the board; it would be possible for him to put
it in words, somewhat in this way: “Well, my opponent has a
queen’s pawn on square a j and one of those things that look like
a Coney Island wooden hoss on square 4-11-44, etc.” Then he
could conduct about one half of a game simultaneously.
No doubt there are other and more important ways of training
thought; I can speak only of the small things of which I have a
little glimmering. Were there teachers who could teach it not
the least of the sciences might be “The Mechanics of Thought.”
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